reasonable doctrines (to one!). Rawls on the other hand, seems to think that there can be more than one kind of reasonable constitutional society 14 , in fact he thinks that it is also possible for there to exist nonliberal, but reasonable, societies. 15 Rawls's criticizes the cosmopolitan view from this perspective, claiming that it, "amounts to saying that all persons are to have the equal liberal rights of a citizen in a constitutional democracy….But this foreign policy simply assumes that only a liberal democratic society can be acceptable." 16 Part of Rawls rejection of the cosmopolitan position, then, involves his commitment to expanding the list of acceptable societies to include "decent hierarchical regimes" alongside liberal constitutional democracies.
The cosmopolitan, he thinks, attempts to impose a singular form of social organization onto diverse peoples with diverse interests. It would be "intolerant" to assume that we have come up with the definitive set of principles by which all people must live. Instead, Rawls fashions his global principles to be inclusive, not exclusive; he wants to allow for a range of acceptable societies.
17
Charles Beitz rejects Rawls' argument from toleration, calling it a circular argument. He suggests that Rawls already accepts a principle of toleration: he only assumes but does not show that focusing on the interests of Peoples as opposed to individuals makes the case for toleration.
18
He says, "If there are reasons for toleration, as no doubt there are, it would seem better to 13 The Law of Peoples, 82. 14 He says, "Even when two or more peoples have liberal constitutional regimes, their conceptions of constitutionalism may diverge and express different variations of liberalism." (LP, 11) 15 His fear may be that one group, the group of modern, industrial, Western nations, could be seen as imposing one set of standards on others who might prefer to follow different, non-Western (but still reasonable) standards. 16 The Law of Peoples, 83, (emphasis added) . 17 The ideal of foreign policy on this view would be to bring all societies into this "range". Liberal societies would then not be charged with the task of converting all nonliberal societies into liberal ones exactly like their own. If there were only one acceptable way to organize a people, it would be difficult to attempt to make all the others fit the mold that one society has created. The goal is not to manufacture societies, but to give them the tools to organize themselves according to reasonable principles. 18 Charles Beitz, "Rawls's Law of Peoples", Ethics, Vol. 110. (July, 2000) , 681.
articulate them within a theory rather than to presuppose them." 19 Like Rawls, Beitz does not develop this criticism in any detailed fashion, which is unfortunate, since here he seems to be mistaken. As I mentioned above, on the cosmopolitan view every single individual (representative) would have to agree to a set of international principles-applicable to all. This would limit (even in the hypothetical case) the number of acceptable sets of principles to one. In such a case there is no question of whether to tolerate other sets of principles, since there are no others. The idea of toleration cannot therefore be drawn out of the cosmopolitan doctrine. But, if there are going to be other sets, as Rawls suggests there will be (if we allow Peoples to freely guide and govern themselves 20 ), then the limitation to the viability of a given set will (only) be that it doesn't conflict with other sets. Thus the standard of tolerance will track those sets of principles that are mutually compatible with one another (i.e., the "reasonable" ones), not the ones that are mutually exclusive. If a set of principles is fundamentally at odds with others, then it cannot be reasonable, since it will inevitably lead to conflict and thus instability (making it self-defeating). For this reason, Rawls should not be seen as presupposing toleration: it is a legitimate outgrowth of the idea that individuals may organize themselves as they see fit, so long as the organizing principles they follow don't undermine the very ability to organize as such.
21
Rawls also seems to suggest that he is being more realistic than the cosmopolitan about the exigencies of the global situation. He says, for example, "The Law of Peoples proceeds from the international political world as we see it….it allows us to examine in a reasonably realistic way what should be the aim of the foreign policy of a liberal democratic people." 22 Again, 19 Beitz, 681. 20 The importance of this aspect to Rawls's theory will be defended later. 21 Although Rawls himself does not advance this argument, it seems to be in line with the decidedly Kantian flavor of much of Rawls's theorizing. What is, however, an apparent and essential (Kantian) ingredient of his theory is that individuals are autonomous and must willingly come to an (hypothetical) agreement with others (i.e. other autonomous actors). 22 The Law of Peoples, 83.
Rawls does not go to any lengths to describe how issues of political realism count against the cosmopolitan view, but perhaps his "realism" argument might run something like this. The cosmopolitan view is far-fetched because it simply cannot occur that we can take all the individual persons of the world, scrap their respective governments, and rebuild a global society from the ground up, with one central governing body to represent the interests of all individuals.
It's a pleasant thought, but, unfortunately, totally unrealistic. Perhaps another way to construe the argument is as suggesting that the cosmopolitan ignores certain realities inherent in the decision procedure of the domestic original position: e.g. that the veil restricts a representative's awareness of the "larger", international situation.
Either way, Beitz criticizes Rawls's argument-this time for being a non sequitur. Again though, he too is short, saying, "considerations of political realism have to do with constraints imposed by the status quo on prospects for change, and thus they pertain to questions about institutional design and reform rather than to those about standards of moral appraisal."
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Although brief, this comment reflects, and depends upon, Beitz's main criticism of Rawls's Law means by "interests", but a common use of the term "interests" (which seems to be the one Beitz is using) refers to the good or bad consequences that may accrue in terms of the well-being (success or failure) of a given individual. From this perspective, his concern with the "ethical primacy" of peoples is that Rawls's view will have a negative impact on the interests or wellbeing of individuals. However, if this is the operative interpretation-i.e. if the "interests" of persons (i.e. individuals) are going to be taken as the standard of "moral appraisal,"-then there may actually be no appreciable ("moral") difference between the cosmopolitan and the Rawlsian.
Both theories purport to extend a protection (of well-being) to all individuals via human rights. Rawls, as quoted above, seems to make this clear in saying that human rights have a "political (moral) force," that, "extends to all societies, and they are binding on all peoples and to bring all peoples into the Society of Peoples; but it also has to be "realistic".
One of the conditions that Rawls sets, "for a liberal conception of justice to be realistic", However, Rawls's relegation of human rights to a position as mere "standards" in a liberal foreign policy might be viewed by some as a significant cheapening of these rights.
Beitz, for one, sees it this way. He says, "it does not appear that human rights, in this view, are to play the broad political role envisioned in the conventional understanding-for example, as bases of claims by individuals against their own governments or as grounds of political action by the various nongovernmental organizations that compose international civil society." 40 Beitz is concerned that, if human rights are conceived as foreign policy standards regulating the treatment of Peoples, then individuals will no longer have recourse to these rights-at least not those individuals that reside in non-decent societies. (This is another way of saying that in The Law of Peoples human rights are not universal.) Here again, Beitz's objection echoes his main criticism of Rawls, that the emphasis on the moral primacy of Peoples over individuals gets 37 The Law of Peoples, 81. 38 Actually, Rawls suggests that human rights form a necessary, though not sufficient, standard (see e.g., fn. 32 & 35) . This is because a society can uphold human rights yet not be well-ordered. "Benevolent absolutisms" would fall into this category. The point I wish to make by this comment is only that, if you make all societies well-ordered, then you will have also secured human rights for all individuals. 39 The Law of Peoples, 93. 40 Beitz, 684. things in the wrong order. Beitz is worried that the result of associating human rights with Peoples will mean that those rights will no longer engage or involve the individual directly, but rather will be mediated through societies or governments. Consequently, it seems that on Rawls's view, the burdens and responsibilities for respecting human rights would also fall squarely on governments, not on individuals.
This individualistic emphasis by Beitz's shows his commitment to a cosmopolitan point of view, and, he criticizes Rawls's theory from this perspective. For example, he says,
We want to say that people are entitled to be treated in certain ways (partly) in virtue of their characteristics as human beings and independently of considerations that might be particular to their own institutions and political cultures. But these are essentially cosmopolitan considerations, and they do not register in an international original position in which the unit of representation is peoples rather than persons and agreement on principles is motivated by their corporate interests as social units rather than the interests of their members as individuals.
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As Beitz points out, the first sentence contains the central tenet of the cosmopolitan view of human rights, viz. that they apply on an individual basis, and because of this they apply to persons independently of their respective governments, so that even someone completely removed from the bounds of any society will continue to retain these rights. The second sentence contains a criticism of Rawlsian rights from this cosmopolitan point of view. The problem with Rawls's view, according to the cosmopolitan, is that it focuses on the interests or well-being of peoples or groups, not individuals.
Of course, Rawls does not deny that his focus is on establishing well-ordered societies.
In fact he repeatedly emphasizes this aspect of his view in deny that looking at Peoples has the negative moral consequences that Beitz suggests it has, viz., its failure to consider the well-being of individuals or persons.
The standards model of rights given by Rawls suggests that when human rights are violated, the "non-intervention" clause of the Law of Peoples gets waived and the "duty to assist 43 Perhaps, it might be contested, this is a moral defect of the theory: viz. that it is self-interested or egocentric. But here, of course, the "self" refers to Peoples-so it's Peoples-centric. Yet, I am still unable to locate a single argument that explains how uniting persons with peoples actually does moral harm to the prospects or interests of persons. This is certainly a cosmopolitan assumption, but it has remained just that, an assumption. Here again, Beitz relies on the point that placing peoples before persons will result in unwanted moral implications that negatively affect individuals. Thus Beitz assumes that Rawls must not be concerned with the plight of the tortured individuals; instead, he is only concerned with rectifying the political situation that allows such torture. Of course, if a concern for the "moral situation" of the individual is cashed out in terms of "interests", then it is not perfectly clear which so-called focus (i.e. either on peoples or on persons) is best able to protect those interests.
And so, Rawls could easily retort that Beitz, the cosmopolitan, is so concerned with individuals that he fails to remedy or even address the institutions or political structures that allow systematic torture to occur in the first place. One might even object to the attempt to confront each and every violation of human rights one by one (i.e. on an individual basis) as an inefficient remedy that ignores the deeper reasons behind the persistence of such abuses. In this respect, it seems that Beitz's criticisms miss their mark, for he is merely talking past Rawls. he calls "decent", and includes it, along with liberal societies, as well-ordered and therefore also acceptable. Such a society may not grant its citizens the full and equal range of freedoms enjoyed in a liberal democratic society, but it is nonetheless a tolerable society (from a foreign policy perspective) because its aims are peaceful (or at least non-aggressive) and it respects human rights. From a "rights as standards" perspective, a "decent" society-just like a liberal one-meets all the standards of acceptable or tolerable societies. However, according to Rawls, on the (less tolerant) cosmopolitan model, such a decent society would not be seen as acceptable and might in fact be subject to some form of intervention or sanction.
As brief and as vague as it is, Rawls's argument no doubt appears to be rather weak.
And, as Beitz pointed out to us earlier, it is Rawls, not the cosmopolitan, who is being charged 53 The Law of Peoples, 82. I will elaborate on the parenthetical remark presently. 54 The Law of Peoples, with making the gratuitous assumption here, viz. that there cannot be one set of global principles that would be accepted by all. In spite of its apparent weakness, what Rawls gives us (in two small paragraphs) is, I will argue, more than meets the eye; or rather, to employ an equally insufficient metaphor, we get only the tip of an iceberg. In order to get the fuller picture however, we may need to help Rawls make his argument more poignant by filling it out and placing it in the context of his general argumentative strategy.
As mentioned earlier, Beitz objects that Rawls's argument is circular because he already accepts a principle of toleration. He says, "If there are reasons for toleration…it would seem better to articulate them within a theory rather than to presuppose them." 55 His criticism seems to suggest that Rawls only assumes, but does not prove, that there can be more than one acceptable kind of society. Apparently, Rawls is being accused of assuming "that all the individuals of the world will never be able to come to one agreement that would be satisfactory to them all." And, the cosmopolitan may continue, even if such unanimity is not possible in the real world, the original position is only hypothetical. The social contract theory does not pretend to conform to any real decision made between real parties, so why not envision it at a global level-so the initial agreement involves everybody-like the cosmopolitan does?
Beitz's argument, I think, relies on a fundamental mischaracterization of the assumption that Rawls makes. Beitz suggests that Rawls assumes that all individuals cannot all agree to the same set of principles-i.e. to come to one agreement. Rawls however never makes any such claim. His assumption, if it is to be called such, is only that every individual may not come to the same agreement, not that they will not. To speculate on the latter would be an egregious assumption, but the former just envisions an open possibility-it is non-speculative. Therefore,
Beitz is wrong to accuse Rawls of holding the latter, a clearly prejudiced assumption. In fact, Rawls says, "without trying to work out a reasonable liberal Law of Peoples, we cannot know that nonliberal societies cannot be acceptable. The possibility of a global original position does not show that, and we can't merely assume it." 56 Thus, Rawls himself is not relying on any assumption about what people will or will not be inclined to agree to. Rather, he is only granting that we should respect every individual's autonomy and ability to decide for oneself. In the end, maybe everyone will come to the same conclusion and agree to the same things; Rawls does not deny this possibility: but we cannot assume that they will. To make such an assumption would actually commit the Rawlsian faux pas of imposing certain values on others rather than allowing them to choose their own. Thus, it is actually the cosmopolitan position that can be seen as relying too heavily on a gratuitous assumption, viz. that all individuals will agree to the same thing. Moreover, Rawls suggests that the "will" part of the cosmopolitan position involves the assumption that the set of principles that would be accepted by all will be that of a liberal constitutional democracy. Thus, it seems that the cosmopolitan assumption amounts to the idea that only one kind of society can be acceptable, a liberal, constitutional democracy. So, rather than succumbing to the charge of circularity, Rawls actually turns the tables on the cosmopolitan by showing that it is his position that relies upon a bold and unwarranted assumption.
The advantages of Rawls's view over the cosmopolitan view can best be illustrated by imagining the circumstances surrounding the formation of groups of persons into societies. We might characterize Rawls's view as a "society-first" view, whereas the cosmopolitan view should be considered an "individual-first" view. On its face, the cosmopolitan view seems innocuous. their own civil societies. To put the point succinctly, there wouldn't be any civil rights in the domestic cosmopolitan society, only human rights. And this in turn affects the extent to which a civil society has the authority to impose sanctions against its own citizens.
From the cosmopolitan perspective, an individual's foremost allegiance will be to the global community, and, only secondarily to their own domestic society(d). 57 That larger community comes first, since it is responsible for establishing the basic protections needed for cooperative social living and for ensuring the well-being of all individuals. 58 Sure, there might be some further set of protections that could be guaranteed by a cosmopolitan society(d), and maybe those things even get called "civil" rights; but, whatever they are called, they would not include those basic principles which make social cooperation possible-those would have already been chosen and subsequently guaranteed according to the global agreement. On the cosmopolitan view the global arrangement is prior to any agreement between parties forming more particular groups or states, i.e., societies(d). Such formations must first respect the global conditions, which would obviously include stipulations regarding the formation and maintenance of societies(d); any further regulations imposed by that society(d) on its citizens would necessarily be more specific (than your basic social rules) and would be pertinent only to that particular society(d). And, most importantly, what we today call civil rights would no longer be regarded as domestic in nature or origin, rather, they would fall under the authority and jurisdiction of a broader global community or ("civic") body-perhaps a "world-state". 57 Here the use of "society" may start to get confusing (this is partially due to the fact that the cosmopolitan view does not allow us to sharply distinguish the two original positions). By "cosmopolitan society" I here mean to refer not to the global community, but to a more limited community within that larger global group, i.e., a state or nation or People. In order to avoid confusion, when I wish to highlight this usage I will put a parenthetic (d) at the end of "society" to distinguish it from the global cosmopolitan society(g). Also, it may even turn out that there can be no such thing as a domestic society(d) in a cosmopolitan world-such a world (view) would seem to tend toward the establishment of one dominant global authority, or world-state. 58 This would be true even if we are speaking of society formation hypothetically. The order of allegiance would seem to be unaffected by whether we conceive of the case hypothetically or realistically..
As it is now, we think of nations as responsible for the care and well-being of their individual citizens, and to have the authority to enforce and impose their own laws directed to this end. But, how can a cosmopolitan society(d) enforce sanctions against violations that it had no authority to enact in the first place? The answer is that it can't; a cosmopolitan society(d) will not have the ultimate authority to police itself on the most basic social issues, rather it will always yield to a higher authority, the global society(g). For example, if society(g) had a rule prohibiting one person from killing another person (period), then a society(d) could enact a law that also prohibits the killing of certain animals (i.e., a more specific law), but it could not enact a law that permits abortion or euthanasia or executions or killing in self-defense (partially repealing the original "parent" law)
. 59 Yet, as the cosmopolitan maintains, it is the greater society(g) that has the interests of individuals in mind; so, why should citizens look to society ( This last concern is one shared by both Rawls and Kant, and it is a concern for the unchecked power of a global super-state. The cosmopolitan view certainly leads us to the 59 I suppose it would be possible for societies(d) to enact laws that alter the original form of the parent law, but they would certainly need to gain permission to do so. The constitution of a society(d) would be regulated by society(g), and so even if a society(d) were able to enact its own laws restricting social behavior, it would not have the ultimate authority to do so-it would not be sovereign in this respect.
question: why would one want to form a constitutional society(d) in the first place, since there is already an established society(g) that takes care of the basic social needs of individuals? And, if there is this cosmopolitan society(g), with the authority to enforce its rules with sanctions, then society(g) looks a lot like a global super-state, with sanction power that crosses all borders.
Perhaps the cosmopolitan has a way of showing that his position does not amount to an endorsement of a world state, 60 but his world-view at the very least blurs the distinction between the need for so-called "global justice for all" and the need for a global super-state to enforce it.
Unlike the rights as standards view, the cosmopolitan does not set any limits on the level or amount of intervention that outsiders may inflict upon a given society(d) in the name of global justice. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls picks out two cosmopolitan principles used by Beitz that show this, "the resource redistribution principle" and the "global distribution principle".
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Both of these principles are unacceptable, according to Rawls, because they fail to set limits or "targets" on the amount of intervention that would be necessary for outsiders to impose on the internal structures of a civil society. 62 For example, he says that, "Beitz views the resource redistribution principle as giving each society a fair chance to establish just political institutions and an economy that can fulfill its members' basic needs." 63 A similar case is made for the "global distribution principle", which is the cosmopolitan's global analogue of the domestic difference principle offered by Rawls in A Theory of Justice. The idea behind both of Beitz's principles is that resource rich nations should redistribute their wealth to resource poor nations to ensure their political and economic success. This may sound like a fine deal for the 60 I will consider this point later. 61 The Law of Peoples, 116. 62 By contrast, Rawls proposes a "duty of assistance" which permits interference, but only up to a point: the point at which that society is capable of becoming a member of the Society of Peoples. The failure of the cosmopolitan position to adequately distinguish between political autonomy and (specifically) economic autonomy may come to light when we consider the workings of a redistribution effort in a cosmopolitan world. Beitz, as was mentioned, proposed a cosmopolitan resource redistribution principle. In the simplest case, there would be one society(d) that that is not self-sufficient economically and one that is. In fact, the latter would be more than self-sufficient since it can safely give away some of its resources. We can imagine then that resources would be diverted from the latter to the former in order to help balance the total distribution of resources. But, in this cosmopolitan world, neither society(d) would be politically self-sufficient, and so, in this case, neither would have fundamental control over how the redistribution effort imposes duties on the institutions of their respective societies. And, this is true regardless of whether or not the cosmopolitan world is envisioned as headed by a "world- In an effort to protect the political integrity of the civil society, Rawls first models a domestic original position; and only then, once a just, domestic society emerges, can we achieve a view of the rest of the world and formulate a foreign policy based on a second original position. In the second original position, peoples or states are recognized as representatives.
But, in the first original position representatives are not supposed to be aware of the existence of other states; in fact, Rawls says that they should view their society as "closed". He mentions this aspect of the first original position in each of his three books, but he does so most extensively in Political Liberalism, from which I will quote at length.
We have assumed that a democratic society, like any political society, is to be viewed as a complete and closed social system. It is complete in that it is self-sufficient and has a place for all the main purposes of human life. It is also closed, as I have said ( § 2.1), in that entry into it is only by birth and exit from it is only by death. We have no prior identity before being in society: it is not as if we came from somewhere but rather we find ourselves growing up in this society in this social position, with its attendant advantages and disadvantages, as our good or ill fortune would have it. For the moment we leave aside entirely relations with other societies and postpone all questions of justice between peoples until a conception of justice for a well-ordered society is on hand. Thus, we are not seen as joining society at the age of reason, as we might join an association, but as being born into society where we will lead a complete life. Think, then, of the principles of justice as designed to form the social world in which our character and our conception of ourselves as persons, as well as our comprehensive views and their conceptions of the good, are first acquired, and in which our moral powers must be realized, if they are to be realized at all. These principles must give priority to those basic freedoms and opportunities in background institutions of civil society that enable us to become free and equal citizens in the first place, and to understand our role as persons with that status.
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As this quote makes clear, for Rawls, the basic rights that allow for cooperative social living must arise from within one's own society. That is, order cannot be imposed from above. But, to do this, parties to the initial agreement must divest themselves of the idea that anything at all exists outside the contract. Representative are to be veiled from this information so that social order may freely grow-up by itself; and therefore that social order must be viewed by its participants as providing the key to a mutually sustainable life. Nothing can substitute for the willingness of persons to establish their own cooperative societies. All democratic societies acknowledge the fundamental importance of an individual's right to have a voice in his government. This idea is at the heart of Rawls's notion of political autonomy and so is also covered under Rawls's "rights as standards" view. The cosmopolitan conception, by contrast, in an effort to procure global equality and welfare, would seem to exclude this aspect of political autonomy from its list of "human rights". It may not exclude democracy per se, but an individual's voice in government would be limited, if that voice sought to secede from, or gain autonomy or independence from, society(g)-an act comparable to treason. 70 Political Liberalism, 40-1.
At the very least, this shows that it is a mistake (made by the cosmopolitan) to charge Rawls with ignoring the complex and ubiquitous interrelations between peoples and individuals on the global stage. In fact his whole book, The Law of Peoples, is devoted to foreign policy issues. He does not ignore the other players on the international scene, he just doesn't think that considerations of their interests or influences should go into the process of designing the basic cooperative institutions of a just, civil society. Those institutions ought to have a chance of gaining self-sufficiency and autonomy, and thus legitimacy, on their own. Of course, the "standards" view sets limits to the capacity of a regime's internal autonomy, but it does so only in the name of autonomy itself. That is, the goal of these "limits" is to protect the right of citizens to be represented by their government. The cosmopolitan view, by contrast, would permit interventionist tactics that may actually undermine the very human rights that those tactics purport to be defending. By interfering at the wrong level, i.e. on the behalf of individuals, the cosmopolitan fails to respect the political autonomy of societies and individuals and thus actually endangers the rights of these same individuals to freely organize and control their own cooperative society.
The cosmopolitan claims to be looking out for the interests of individuals, but he cannot accuse Rawls of failing to do the same. Rawls's view is in no way opposed to the idea of providing aid to victims or imposing sanctions on violators. What he does maintain, however, is that our foreign policy efforts be primarily directed at preventing human rights abuses by providing an atmosphere in which well-ordered (non-human-rights-violating) societies can develop. Human rights are tied to our capacities and responsibilities as social individuals. As Rawls points out, different social individuals may formulate slightly different societies. The "rights as standards" view respects this possibility, but at the same time it does not permit 27 Greg Hakos, Rawls and Cosmopolitanism intolerant or unreasonable regimes that commit human rights abuses. There is no way to separate persons from their autonomy with regard to an agreement on principles of social cooperation without thereby eliminating the possibility for social cooperation altogether. And, this political autonomy is just as much an individual's right as his right not to live in an oppressive society. 71 Unfortunately, in the real world, we can't expect (or assume) unanimity among persons any more than we can expect all societies to be good ones. But, we can't bend people to our will either. And, this I take to be the central concern of the "human rights as standards" view: it walks the fine line between too much and too little interference. In general, Rawls's view combines a recognition of the essentially social character of human principles with a recognition that it must be individual human beings themselves who adopt and live by these principles. 71 The current situation in Iraq is a perfect example of this. The Iraqis are, at one and the same time, both happy, to see the oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein fall, and sad or angry, to see their "liberators" standing in the way of their political autonomy-they don't want to be told how to govern their country.
